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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIII
FIFTEEN YEARS OF CHANGE IN MARYLAND
MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT LAW AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROCEDURES
By JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.*
Fifteen years ago the present writer published in the
REvmw an article' on Marriage and Annulment Law in
Maryland, and shortly thereafter an (unsigned) comment2
on Domestic Relations Procedures in Maryland. It is pro-
posed herein to bring this material down to date and to dis-
cuss the cases decided and the statutes' enacted in the in-
terim which either add to or change the law. In doing this
the same sequence of topical headings will be observed as
in the former two papers which are now being jointly
supplemented.'
PART ONE
VoID AND VOmABL MARRIAGES IN MARYLAND
AND THEIR ANuLEnT
THE GENmiAL DIFF 'NcE BEVwEEN TOTAL
VOIDNESS AND VOIDABIITY 5
The only interim change relevant to this general head-
ing concerns the legitimacy of the offspring of void or void-
able marriages, which had been discussed at pages 212, 213
and 214 of the original article. That discussion,6 which
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland, and Faculty Editor of the
RmEvw.
Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annul-
ment, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211 (1938). This, and the following Comment, have
been reprinted and published in a single pamphlet as Reprint Series Number
Two, Maryland Law Review.
2 Comment, The Confusing Maryland Domestic Relations Procedures, 4
Md. L. Rev. 275 (1940).
' Subsequent references herein to the Code of Public General Laws of
Maryland (Flack, 1951), will be given as "Code" or "new Code", followed
by Article and Section. Whenever a statute has been once or more amended
in the interim, the respective Session Laws citations will not be given, save
where of especial Interest, and the reader is referred to the headings of
the respective Code sections for the year and chapter in question.
' For each heading or sub-heading herein there will be a footnote showing
the pages and footnote sequences in the earlier treatment under the same
title. The new Code section numbers for Code citations in the old footnotes
will there be given, unless given in connection with a note to the following
new text. By using the sequence of "old" footnote numbers shown herein,
the reader will be able to trace specific topics from the older treatment to
the present. Reference to the two papers here supplemented will be only
by Volume and Page of the RnvxEw, I.e., 2 Rev. 211, etc.
' 2 Rev. 211-216, old notes 2-15.
4 2 Rev. 212-214, old notes 5-10.
128
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CHANGES
asserted the then lack of any statutory preservation of
the legitimacy of the offspring of defective marriages, is
now irrelevant, due to the enactment of a statute in 19 49 ,"
amended in a slight connection in 1950, which attempts
directly to preserve the legitimacy of such offspring.
The statute still leaves certain questions, for that it
provides in effect that whenever any marriage is annulled
in an equity court or a criminal court or by a divorce' for
the "void ab initio" reason, the offspring of such marriage
shall be deemed and declared to be the legitimate issue of
the parents. This raises two questions. One is, does it
apply equally to the annulment of totally void and merely
voidable marriages? If only the latter then the other diffi-
culty does not arise, for that the statute then merely
changes the rule that the offspring of voidable marriages
are illegitimate only if there be an annulment, and then
from birth.
But if this statute is meant to apply also to the children
of void marriages which are annulled (wherein the annul-
ment is but a declaratory ruling and is not an essential
step), then the further difficulty arises, what of the legiti-
macy of the offspring of such void marriages if there be no
annulment. The normal rule is that collateral attack can
be made on such marriages and the legitimacy of the off-
spring thus attacked.
It would be peculiar if the end product of the statute
were that the offspring of a bigamous or inter-racial mar-
riage, for example, should be legitimate if the marriage
were annulled, but illegitimate if it were not, but this is a
possibility as the statute reads.
7 Code, Art. 16, Sec. 36. Consider, in connection with this, case of Milton
v. Escue, 93 A. 2d 258 (Md., 1953), where the Court Indicated that upon
proper amended averments and proof it would recognize either legitimation
or legitimacy under the applicable law of Virginia, which declared the issue
to be legitimate, even when the marriage of the parents was null in law,
or annulled. The parents here had never been married, other than by a
possible common law or contract marriage, but the Court found the Vir-
ginia law to be that such type of marriage was regarded as one "null in
law" for the purpose of the issue being legitimate. The Virginia statute
thus goes farther on the surface than does the present Maryland one,
although the text above indicates the desirability of so doing. The RMrvsw
plans to carry a casenote on Milton v. Escue in a forthcoming number..
S (Old notes 7, 8, and 9). Now Code, Art. 16, See. 33. The grounds are
now adultery, eighteen months abandonment, three years voluntary separa-
tion, imprisonment for eighteen months under a three year felony sentence,
as well as "void ab initlo" and impotence; and Insanity, added by Code,
Art. 16, Sec. 35.
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THE REQUIR1ZMNS OF AND IMPEDITWENS
TO A VALID MARRIAGE
(1) Conflict of Laws °
While there have been no statutory changes in this area,
yet there have been several Court of Appeals cases which
have concerned the Conflict of Laws idea of recognizing
marriages as valid if valid by the law of the place of
performance.
On differences between our formalities and those of
other states, there have been two cases in each of which
the divergent ceremony requirement of the other state
was recognized."
In Henderson v. Henderson,2 the Court of Appeals
recognized as valid under the law of the District of Colum-
bia a common law or simple contract marriage, of a sort
not valid had it happened in Maryland, and it did this in
order to find the parties married by virtue of having lived
together there after an earlier marriage ceremony in Iowa,
which was invalid for that one of the parties was then still
under an effective ban against remarriage in a Virginia
divorce decree.
Likewise in Schmeizl v. Schmeizl,"3 an unusual type of
marriage ceremony of California was recognized for pur-
poses of the case, that for persons who live together without
being validly married and wish to have a marriage cere-
mony with a minimum of publicity in the matter. Under it
a clergyman can perform the ceremony and record it only
in his Church records.
Then, on the particular point of the effectiveness of a
ban against remarriage in the divorce decree of another
state to render invalid a subsequent marriage violating its
terms,' 4 the Henderson case 15 gave effect to the law of Vir-
ginia, where the divorce was granted, so as to invalidate
an attempted marriage prior to the expiration of the ban.
S2 Rev. 216, old note 16.
10 2 Rev. 216-220, old notes 17-33. Old note 25, last three lines now obsolete.
Old note 29, the statute was ratified.
n (Old note 20). See Milton v. Escue, supra, n. 7, regarding the Virginia
rule that a common law marriage is not generally valid, but is sufficient as
one "null in law" for purposes of legitimacy.
'87 A. 2d 403 (Md., 1952).
134 Md. 584, 42 A. 2d 106 (1945) ; same case on second appeal on another
point, 186 Md. 371, 46 A. 2d 619 (1946).
14 (Old note 30).
15 Supra, note 12.
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Then the Maryland case of Bannister v. Bannister,16
which was noted in the REviEw, T involved a variation of
the ban on remarriage. There the wife had procured an
interlocutory divorce decree in California, not to be final
for a certain period, and after that period, when she could
have had it made final but had not done so, she neverthe-
less in California married her second husband, who sought
annulment for bigamy in the Maryland court. In the mean-
while, the California legislature had passed a curative act
permitting such divorce decrees to be made final nunc pro
tunc, and validating marriages performed after the time
that they could have been made final, even if not yet made
final at the time of the marriage. The Maryland Court of
Appeals denied the annulment on the ground that the wife's
second marriage was valid, having been validated by the
California curative act and the entering up of the divorce
decree under its provisions, 8 and held in effect that the
law of the place of performance (California) governed as
well as to validating marriages as to their initial validity.
In the REviEw's note on the case it was suggested 9 that,
in effect, the Maryland Court was failing to apply the nor-
mal bigamy exception of public policy to the rule of valid
where celebrated valid everywhere. The real effect of the
California curative act was to tolerate a form of bigamy,
and to legalize a marriage which was bigamous in its incep-
tion, although it was argued that this was a substantially
desirable result.
The trial court Fleet case,2" also noted in the REviEw"
had an aspect of Conflict of Laws, although it was more con-
cerned with local formalities and it will there be discussed.
There was an attempted telephone marriage between Mary-
land and Oklahoma. The trial court in Maryland granted
an annulment of it on the ground that it was not an ade-
quate ceremony by Maryland law, even if that applied.
And it could not be rationalized as a valid Oklahoma cere-
mony even if the contract were made there for the reason
that the Oklahoma idea of common law or contract mar-
riage requires cohabitation to follow, and it had not. There-
fore, it was impossible to validate this marriage by any
Conflict of Laws idea of the applicable law of another state.
- 181 Md. 177, 29 A. 2d 287 (1942).
17 Note, Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 7 Md. L. Rev. 254 (1943).
1B Actually, the California decree was not entered until after the Maryland
annulment suit had been filed.
19 Supra, note 17, 7 Rev. 257-8.
90 Ct. Ct. No. 2, Baltimore City, Baltimore Daily Record, October 23, 1946.
0 Note, Marriage Performed by Telephone Invalid, 9 Md. L. Rev. 79 (1948).
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(2) Formalities22
Most of the changes in this field have been statutory,
including some slight technical changes in the provisions
as to who may celebrate marriage.23
With reference to the various unusual types of at-
tempted marriage mentioned in the old article at page 22224
(proxy, telephone, on the high seas, by mail) the only
ruling obtained in the interim has been the trial court
Fleet case, mentioned also in the previous section,25 which
ruled that an attempted marriage by telephone from Mary-
land to Oklahoma was not a valid marriage if governed
by Maryland law, which apparently it was, for that such
a type ceremony did not comply with our requirement of
a religious ceremony, even though the minister took part
in the telephone conversation between the bride here and
the groom there.
There have been some slight changes in the administra-
tive details of the marriage license laws.2 6
The alternative of publication of the banns in lieu of
procuring a marriage license has been repealed27 so that
now a marriage license is required in all cases and even if
the banns are published, still a marriage license should be
procured.
The law requiring a forty eight hour wait between appli-
cation for a license and issuance thereof, which was pend-
ing on referendum before, was ratified and has been several
times amended.28 When a local newspaper published the
"scandal" of the too free issuance of waivers of the law in
one of our county seats where marriages are more fre-
quently performed, the Legislature amended it to require
that one of the parties be a resident of Maryland in order
to obtain a waiver. Then, after the United States entered
World War II, it was found necessary further to amend
2 Rev. 220-224, old notes 34-53.
2 (Old note 40). New Code sections are Art. 62, Sec. 4; Art. 27, See. 461;
Art. 27, Sec. 464. Art. 62, Sec. 4, has been changed by repealing the refer-
ence to publishing the banns, transferring the detail for Quaker marriages
to Art. 62, Sec. 5, and reducing the period for return of the certificate to
the Clerk to five days.
2, (Old note 45).
2 Supra, notes 20-21.
2 (Old notes 48, 49A, 50). New Code sections are now Art. 62, Secs. 4-15,
18-19; Art. 27, Sec. 462; Art. 27, Sec. 463; Art. 62, Sec. 15; Md. Code (1924),
Art. 62, Sec. 12, has been repealed; and Art. 62, Sec. 4. Changes include the
administrative detail of the 48 Hour Law and its waiver, and the Marriage
Age Law.
27 This was in Md. Code (1939), Art. 62, Secs. 4, 14, 15, repealed by Md.
Laws, 1941, Ch. 14.
Code, Art. 62, Secs. 6, 7, and 11.
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the waiver law to permit waivers for armed forces per-
sonnel stationed in Maryland, although not residents. A
parallel statute authorized the waiver by the court clerks
for such personnel regardless. Furthermore, it is now pro-
vided that licenses shall be applied for and issued only
during regular office hours.
The recent statute fixing new ages for marriage, dis-
cussed below under the substantive heading of Age,2 9 also
contains considerable detail concerning the issuance of the
license and the showing of necessary parental consent,
and the like, as is required under the statute.
A new provision for Quaker marriages is now in force,
calling for the attestation of two overseers of the ceremony
in place of the formerly required twelve witnesses. 0
On the point of what procedure is available for obtain-
ing an annulment (i.e., a declaratory judgment of voidness)
of a marriage defective for lack of proper solemnization,
it would seem that the revised annulment procedure, dis-
cussed below3 now gives the answers and resolves some of
the doubts expressed before. The revised procedure seems
to tolerate annulment for any cause going to the validity
of the marriage, and so the statutory-equity procedure now
in force would seem to cover it, and, in fact, it was so used
in the trial court Fleet case 32 discussed twice above, even
before the revision of the procedure.
There is still the doubt expressed before33 whether a
divorce for "void ab initio" could be secured. It would seem
clear that the criminal method is not available for this
impediment.34
(3) Competency of Parties5
A. Subsisting Prior Marriage (Bigamy) 6
The crime of bigamy has been involved in one statute
and two cases. A recent statute37 provides a new code sec-
tion setting forth a short form of indictment for the crime
of bigamy.
Code, Art. 62, Sees. 9, 10. 11. Infra, notes 54-60.
80 (Old note 51), Art. 62, Sec. 5.
Infra, notes 74-104.
f Supra, notes 20, 21, 25.
m (Old note 53).
" Because the only criminal activity involved, such as lack of license, does
not defeat the validity of the marriage.
852 Rev. 224, old note 54.
2 Rev. 225-228, old notes 55-68.
Code, Art. 27, Sec. 21. Code reference in old note 56 is now Art. 27,
Sec. 20.
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The case of Slansky v. State, 8 (which arose prior to the
time that the Court of Appeals had the power to review
the sufficiency of the evidence under the new criminal
rules) affirmed a conviction of bigamy where the defense
was a valid Nevada divorce obtained by the alleged biga-
mist before he entered into the second ceremony. The
jury, by convicting, apparently found the Nevada divorce
to be invalid, and the Court of Appeals, lacking the power
at that time to review the sufficiency of the evidence,
affirmed, without going into the actual validity of the
Nevada divorce. Now it could do so, at the level of review
of sufficiency.
The other case is that of Wright v. State, 9 where the
Court of Appeals reversed a conviction of bigamy for
marrying a third wife, being still married to the second,
for that there was no proof negating that the first wife
was still living and undivorced when he married the second.
Apparently the Court refused to use the presumption of
death or divorce of the first wife so as to make the second
marriage valid and the third therefore bigamous and
criminal.
The Court ruled that the normal presumption of a
divorce of an earlier marriage, raised by proof of a later
one, has no place in defense to a bigamy prosecution, that
it was not applicable to create a reasonable doubt of the
continuation of the second marriage here, nor could the
State use it to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the termi-
nation of the first marriage so as to make the second valid
and the third bigamous.
In the original article there was considerable discussion
of this presumption against bigamy, found in the Bowman
v. Little40 rule of strict proof of the impediment former
marriage; and in the Shaffer v. Richardson4 1 rule of the
presumption of the termination (either by death or divorce)
of an impediment former marriage, which presumption is
raised by the later marriage, even if the former be suffi-
ciently proved. There are two recent cases on this.
The first was Schmeizl v. Schmeizl,42 where the estate
of the intestate husband was trying to defeat the wife's
claim to a widow's share on the ground that she had
divorced him prior to his death. Their proof of this was
that she had eloped with another man to California, had
-192 Md. 94, 63 A. 2d 599 (1"949).
81 A. 2d 602 (Md., 1951).
10 (Old note 60), 101 Md. 273, 61 A. 223 (1905).
(Old note 62), 125 Md. 88, 93 A. 391 (1915).
Supra, note 13.
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gone through a peculiar local marriage ceremony allowed
there,43 which raised a presumption of her having obtained
a divorce from the decedent. There was also the Adminis-
trator's testimony that she told him that she had obtained
a divorce, but this was contradicted by his earlier testimony
otherwise and which was the only proof of her second
marriage, and the Court disregarded it, accepted her testi-
mony that she had not been divorced, and reversed a finding
against her below. In effect, the Court followed the Bow-
man v. Little rule of strict proof of secret marriages (as
this one was under the California peculiar procedure) and
also found that any Shaffer v. Richardson presumption of
termination of earlier marriage had been rebutted by the
administrator's own testimony and his cross-examination of
the wife, both of which to his disfavor rebutted any pre-
sumption of innocence.
The other case was Dukes v. Eastern Tar Products
Corp.," where the Court affirmed a finding that the claim-
ant was not the lawful widow of the decedent. She had
married another man in South Carolina prior to her mar-
riage to the decedent also in South Carolina, at a time
when that State granted no divorces. Both marriages were
proved by record evidence, and the Court disregarded her
testimony that she never really married the first, and found
any presumption of divorce of it sufficiently rebutted, as
it is not conclusive, therefore her marriage to him was
bigamous and she was not his widow.
As was mentioned above under Conflict of Laws, there
were bigamy aspects in the cases of Bannister v. Ban-
nister,5 where a California marriage was recognized de-
spite its being performed before the divorce had been made
final, because the California curative act had been complied
with; and Henderson v. Henderson,46 where a remarriage
within the time limit prohibited by the divorce decree was
held valid only because of a subsequent common law mar-
riage in the District of Columbia after the time had expired.
In the case of Townsend v. Morgan,47 noted in the
RLvmw, 4 the Court of Appeals ordered the granting of an
annulment for bigamy to one who had knowingly com-
mitted bigamy in marrying under the circumstances, and
11 Discussed and described, Ibid. The case cites and quotes the California
law in question.
"80 A. 2d 39 (Md., 1951).
4Supra, notes 16 and 17.
,Supra, note 12.
'7192 Md. 168, 63 A. 2d 743 (1949).
,Note, "Clean Hands" Not Required for Bigamy Annulment, 10 Md. L.
Rev. 84 (1949).
1953]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
it ruled that "clean hands" were not essential to obtain a
bigamy annulment, which was void and that therefore the
parties were entitled to a ruling as to the fact of the voidness
regardless of guilt in the matter.49
As to the proper procedure for annulling a bigamous
marriage, it can probably now be said that the change in
annulment procedure now makes available the statutory-
equity procedure for annulling for bigamy, although there
is still the doubt expressed before as to whether the divorce
for "void ab initio" technique may be used. The reformed
procedure preserves the idea that a criminal conviction for
bigamy shall serve as an annulment.
B. Relationship51
C. Race (Miscegenation)52
For both of the above headings the same might be said
as to interim developments, that the only changes are in
the numbering of the Code sections, and in the clarifica-
tion of the point of the proper annulment procedures to
use for avoiding the former type and for declaring the total
voidness of the latter type. It would seem that the statu-
tory-equity procedure clearly is available for both, that the
same doubts expressed before as to divorce for "void ab
initio" still obtain, and that the new procedure continues
the criminal technique for relationship and provides it for
the first time for inter-racial marriages and thus puts the
two on equal standing with reference to procedure, along
with bigamous marriages.
D. Age53
Since the previous article the legislature has passed and
then twice amended a statute 4 which expands the previous
"In Donnelly v. Donnelly, 84 A. 2d 89 (Md., 1951), It was held that a
deed to a man and woman, the latter described as his "wife", created a
tenancy in common where the marriage between them was bigamous.
"The writer is informed that It is occasionally used in trial court cases.
512 Rev. 228-231, old notes 69-81. New Code sections now are: (Old 70),
Art. 62, Secs. 1, 2. (Old 74), Art. 62, Sec. 1. (Old 75), Art. 27, Sees. 401, 457,
458, and 459. (Old 76), Art. 27, Sec. 457. (Old 77), Art. 62, Sec. 3. (Old 79),
Art. 27, Sec. 466.
"2 Rev. 231-23Z old notes 82-88. New Code sections now are: (Old 82),
Art. 62, Sec. 17. (Old 83), Art. 27, Sec. 466. (Old 87), Art. 27, Secs. 466
and 460, and see also, Code, Art. 62, Secs, 4, 6, providing that the Clerk shall
inquire the color of the applicants for license, and the license shall state It.
(Old 88), Art. 27, Sec. 513.
"2 Rev. 233-235, old notes 89-99.
5(Old note 93). Code, Art. 62, Sees. 9, 10, 11- The older statute, Md. Code
(1924), Art. 27, See. 363, which punished the minister for marrying without
parental consent was repealed, Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 728.
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statutory rule of parental consent for the marriages of
males under 21 and females under 18, and has added to it
a further provision that there shall be no marriages at all,
even with consent of parents for males under 18 and females
under 16, save with reference to the pregnancy of the
female. Changing the detail as to this has been the purpose
of the numerous amendments. 5
In a comment" published in the REVIEW about the origi-
nal statute of 1939, the stand was taken as it had been taken
in the previous article57 and in an earlier treatment,58 that
the statute was directory only and did not go to the essential
validity of the marriage, so that a marriage in violation
of any provision of the statute, if it actually happens, is
nevertheless a valid marriage and is neither void nor void-
able, lay opinion to the contrary. The arguments for this
view have been sufficiently given in the comment on the
statute of 1939 and in the earlier treatments. The Maryland
Court of Appeals has not yet definitively ruled on the mat-
ter, but professional opinion seems to be in accord with
the view expressed above.
Furthermore, two cases from other states, ruling on the
validity of marriages entered into in Maryland in violation
of the new statutory rules, have agreed with the point and
have denied annulments, when sought for no other reason
then the violation of the statute. In Hitchens v. Hitchens,59
the trial court of the District of Columbia, in a well rea-
soned published opinion denied the annulment of a mar-
riage performed in Maryland without parental consent at
ages when parental consent should have been obtained
under the statute, and, in effect, ruled that the Maryland
law in the matter was only directory and not mandatory,
and while the marriage might be criminal yet it was not
void or voidable.
The particular provisions of Code, Art. 62, Sec. 9, about pregnancy are:
".... Provided, however, that on the certificate of a licensed physician,
presented with the application for a marriage license, to the effect that
the girl is pregnant or has given birth to a child, a marriage license may
be issued without the consent of her parent or guardian, and if the
putative father of the child or prospective child of a girl under eighteen
years of age is over sixteen years of age, a marriage license may be
issued without the consent of his parents or guardian."
06 Comment, A Query About the New Marriage Age Law, 3 Md. L. Rev.
340 (1939). This was unsigned, although written by the present writer.
2 Rev. 233-235.
I Note, Annulment of Marriage for Dure8s Where Pre-marital Relations
Have Occurred, 1 Md. L. Rev. 348, 353-4 (1937), noting Lurz v. Lurz, 170
Md. 428, 184 A. 906, 185 A. 676 (1936).
047 F. Supp. 73 (D.C.D.C., 1942).
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, likewise, in
Needam v. Needam, ° denied an annulment to a Virginia
couple who had gone to Maryland and had wrongfully
obtained a license when they should have had parental
consent but did not, and the court also felt that the Mary-
land law was directory. It spoke more of the Virginia law
in the matter, which apparently it felt was the same and
did not go to the essential validity of the marriage.
While both these cases were concerned with violation
of the parental consent ages rather than the basic minimum
ages of 16 and 18, yet neither suggested any possible dis-
tinction in that regard and both spoke of the Maryland
statute on the whole as being merely directory. This is the
view that has been advanced heretofore by the REVIEw
both as to the new Maryland legislation and as to the law
prior to it when there was only the parental consent statute
on the books. Thus the view still holds that the essential
ages are 12 for females and 14 for males, above which a
marriage is completely valid, and below which down to 7
it is only voidable.
The previous speculation about what is the proper pro-
cedure can be answered as for the impediments mentioned
above, to wit, such marriages as can be annulled (which
would be only those under the ages of 12 or 14, unless the
Court of Appeals is going to find the new statute manda-
tory) can so be annulled by the statutory-equity procedure;
although it is doubtful that the divorce procedure may be
used; and clearly the criminal procedure is not available
inasmuch as it is not mentioned, and such marriages as are
criminal are not even voidable anyhow, according to the
views expressed above.
E. Physical Condition (Impotence)61
There has been no change in this law except in the num-
bering of the relevant Code section62 and continued doubt
whether any other procedure than the divorce procedure,
which specially mentions impotence, may be used to annul.
Probably the statutory-equity procedure is not available
despite the recent reform, for that impotence would prob-
ably not be a ground of voidability at law but for the specific
mention in the divorce statute. Certainly the criminal tech-
nique is not available, because impotence is no crime.
6 183 Va. 681, 33 S. E. 2d 288 (1945).
2 Rev. 235-236, old notes 100-104.
Now Code, Art. 16, Sec. 33.
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(4) Intention and Consent
(The Contract Impediments)63
The only changes in general for these impediments con-
sist of the statute mentioned above64 attempting to pre-
serve the legitimacy of the offspring of marriages which are
annulled; and clarification of the procedure.
Whereas, before, a bill in equity, under the general
equity practice and the inherent powers of the courts of
equity, was the proper procedure for annulling for these
impediments, now the equity practice has been woven into
the statutory-equity procedure and such sanction has been
given to the use of a bill in equity for these impediments
as well as for all others. The doubts earlier expressed about
the use of the divorce procedure still obtain; and it would
seem that the criminal technique is definitely not available,
for lack of mention of these impediments, and for lack of
any crime concerned with them.
A. Intention 5
B. Insanity66
C. Intoxication"'
D. Fraud68
There have been two developments on fraud in the in-
terim, one is the statutory repeal 9 of the ground for a
vinculo divorce of the premarital unchastity of the wife,
which, while it was on the books, was in effect a technique
for coping with the problem of that type of fraud. While so,
there was little need for annulments for such fraud, but
with its repeal the problem arose as to whether sufficiently
strong cases of such fraud would be actionable for equitable
annulments.
The Court of Appeals implicitly recognizes that in a
strong enough case such a fraud would be actionable, by
considering on the merits, in the case of Behr v. Behr,70
a bill for annulment for fraud where the husband alleged
that the wife had concealed from him her being pregnant
612 Rev. 236-240, old notes 105-116.Code, Art. 16, Sec. 36, supra, note 7.
2 Rev. 240-242, old notes 117-121.
2 Rev. 242-244, old notes 122-128.
2 Rev. 244, old notes 129-130.
2 Rev. 244-248, old notes 131-147.
(Old note 138), Md. Laws, 1939, Ch. 558.
'181 Md. 422, 30A. 2d 750 (1943).
1953]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
by another man at the time of the marriage. The Court
denied the annulment, both on the ground that it found that
he himself had had premarital relations with her, and at
a time making it possible that he was the father of the
child; and also for that he had otherwise ratified the fraud,
if any, by continuing marital relations with her after his
discovery of her being pregnant, too soon to have become
so by him after his marriage to her.
Then in the trial court case of Baldwin v. Baldwin,71 the
Anne Arundel County Circuit Court granted an annulment
to a husband for his wife's concealment of having borne an
illegitimate child by another man, prior to his marriage
to her. Thus it regarded this as an actionable fraud of the
sort under discussion. The two cases were jointly noted
in the REVIEW72 against the background of the problem of
fraud in the concealment of aspects of the wife's premarital
unchastity, the statutory ground for divorce having been
abolished.
E. Duress73
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF ANNUMENT AND
SIVIIAR1 PROCEDINGS
7 4
There has been considerable revision of the annulment
procedures since the previous article was published, and
almost all of this change and clarification has been dis-
cussed already in a comment in an earlier issue of the
REVIEW. 75 It is not proposed to reiterate this discussion in
detail, inasmuch as it is up to the moment, save for specific
later items to be mentioned, and the reader is referred to it
for the full treatment of the interim changes in annulment
procedure, but the essence of the changes will be mentioned
in the proper place herein.
One general change has been mentioned above herein,7 8
the recent statute attempting to preserve the legitimacy of
the issue of annulled marriages. Also, the provision for the
transmission of records of vital statistics from the court
clerk's offices to the State Board of Health has been
amended to include annulments as well as divorces and
'v No. 1898 Divorces, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland.
"Note, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud as to Matters Related to Pre-
marital Unchastity, 7 Md. L. Rev. 238 (1943).
s 2 Rev. 248-249, old notes 148-152.
1, 2 Rev. 249-250, old note 153.
"Comment, Annulment Jurisdiction Clarified, 9 Md. L. Rev. 63 (1948).
This was unsigned, although written by the present writer.
" Supra, note 7.
[VOL. XIII
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CHANGES
marriages in the proceedings required to be recorded again
in the central vital statistics offices.77
One case, that of Townsend v. Morgan, discussed above
herein7s and also earlier noted in the EVIEW 7 is relevant,
in that it ruled that "clean hands" are not necessary for the
plaintiff, otherwise entitled, to be granted an annulment
for bigamy.
A. The Statutory Method8"
An important step taken by the clarifying legislation in
the interim was to integrate the previous statutory method
of annulment8' and the previous general equity method,
which was earlier treated as the third and separate of the
methods.8 2 It now seems appropriate to regard them as a
single method and to set apart the criminal method which,
to a limited extent was included in the old statutory
method. Now that it has been extended to all possible mar-
riage impediments which are both criminal and affect the
essential validity of the marriage, it will be regarded as the
third method, distinct from the statutory-equity method.
The recent statute accomplished this reform by assimi-
lating annulments to divorce and by including reference
to annulments in equity (for any cause, without stating
that specifically) as being granted on bill in equity under
the same circumstances as divorces may be granted.83
Now any cause entitling to an annulment may be liti-
gated by a civil action between the spouses upon bill in
equity as for a divorce, under the provisions of the inte-
grated statutory-equity method, and no longer is there a
separate "general equity method" having as its authority
only the inherent power of equity with no statute to ratify
that.
The criminal method s4 not only extends the technique
to a third cause, inter-racial marriages, beyond the former
bigamous and incestuous ones, but it has the new pro-
cedural detail that the criminal conviction shall serve as an
annulment from and after the transcribing of the docket
Code, Art. 62, Sec. 18.Supra, note 47.
Supra, note 48.
2 Rev. 250, old notes 154-157.
' (Old note 154). Now Code, Art. 62, Sec. 16.
See 2 Rev. 251.
$,Code, Art. 16, See. 31. This is referred to in Code. Art. 62, Sec. 16, as
permitting annulments for "any cause". An earlier statute, Md. Laws, 1945,
Ch. 664, had deleted the anomalous reference to the Superior Court of Balti-
more City.
0, Code, Art. 62, See. 16; and see 2 Rev. 250.
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entries to the equity docket of the same court or, in Balti-
more City, to the docket of one of the equity courts, pre-
sumably where normal annulment cases would be docketed
in those courts. The criminal provision, as it now reads,
extends the technique to all marriage impediments which
are also indictable crimes, to wit, the three mentioned.
B. The Divorce Method15
There has been no change in the divorce method of an-
nulment, i.e., divorce for "void ab initio" or impotence,
other than the statutory repeal of the former third basis,
the pre-marital unchastity of the wife."6 Thus, save for this,
the discussion in the previous article still stands as to the
details of this method, as the clarifying legislation made no
change in the method, although it has been mentioned in
other legislation impinging on annulment in recognition of
its being an alternative technique.
C. The General Equity Method 7
As mentioned above, this former method is now inte-
grated by legislation into what is now called the statutory-
equity method, and no longer does the power to annul cer-
tain types of marriage depend merely on the inherent
power of equity but all annulments (at least the civil ones
upon bill in equity) are based upon positive legislation, as
is also the case for the divorce method and the criminal
method.
Rather, if a third separate method were to be named now
it would be the criminal method, formerly under the old
statutory one, and itself further established as a result of
the clarifying legislation in the meanwhile.
D. Miscellaneous Methods8
In connection with the case of Ridgely v. Ridgely,s9 dis-
cussed before as to the capacity of a third person to bring
an annulment suit in his own right, there should be men-
2 Rev. 251, old notes 15S-163.
(Old note 158). Code, Art. 16, Sec. 33, particular provision repealed by
Md. Laws, 1939, Ch. 558.
112 Rev. 251-252, old notes 164-165.
812 Rev. 252-256, old notes 166-175. New Code sections are: (Old 170),
Art. 62, Sec. 16. (Old 174), Md. Code (1924), Art. 16, Sees. 28-34, have been
repealed, Md. Laws, 1947, Ch. 108. (Old 175), Art. 62, Sec. 16.
(Old note 167), 79 Md. 298, 29 A. 597, 25 L. R. A. 800 (1894), discussed
2 Rev. 253-256.
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tioned an aspect of the Ewald case9" overlooked in the pre-
vious discussion.
in that case the woman had been married twice and
had obtained a divorce from her first husband and married
her second husband, and the first husband had himself
married a new wife and had had children by her. The
second husband brought a suit to annul the marriage to the
woman on the ground that the divorce from her first hus-
band was defective and that therefore the second marriage
to him was bigamous. The first husband sought to intervene
and oppose the annulment to protect the validity of his
own remarriage and the legitimacy of his second group of
children. Whether he was lawfully entitled to intervene
became moot because the Court denied the second husband
the annulment for bigamy on the merits of the case, and
so the first husband obtained the relief he sought incident-
ally, without the Court having to decide the difficult ques-
tion of his standing to intervene and oppose the granting
of the annulment to the second husband.
The speculation at page 255 of the former article about
the use of declaratory judgment procedure as a way of at
least obtaining a ruling in favor of the validity of a mar-
riage has had some light shed upon it by the interim legis-
lation. In the meanwhile the Legislature has adopted9' and
then re-enacted92 the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act93
and in the course of the latter added a special provision94
specifically declaring that declaratory judgments should
not be used for obtaining divorces or annulments. So it is
made clear that declaratory procedure is not another type
of annulment procedure.
But there is still left open the possibility of using declar-
atory procedure, not to annul a marriage, which means a
ruling against its validity, but to declare its validity or con-
tinued existence as the case may be. This may depend on
whether the question be validity to begin with, or the
validity of a questioned divorce that, if valid, would have
terminated it. It is to be hoped that the declaratory pro-
cedure will be interpreted to allow persons to litigate in
favor of marriages, either from the start or their continu-
ance, because otherwise, there is no procedure for so obtain-
ing a ruling short of making a test case out of some other
-167 Md. 594, 175 A. 464 (1934).
Md. Laws, 1939, Ch. 294.
2 Md. Laws, 1945, Ch. 724.
Code, Art. 31A.
" Ibid, Sec. 6.
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type of procedure where the validity of the marriage would
only be collaterally in focus.
E. Territorial Jurisdiction to Annul"
Many of the doubts expressed in the old text at pages
256, 257 and 258, about the jurisdictional basis to annul
marriages have been resolved by the provisions of the new
statute96 assimilating annulments to divorces for purposes
of territorial jurisdiction and notice by publication. It is
now clearly provided that an annulment procedure may be
brought either where the plaintiff resides or the defendant
resides or the marriage was performed; and that notice
by publication is equally adequate as in cases of divorce.
Thus, much clarification on this score has been accom-
plished. It is still left uncertain whether annulment juris-
diction can be asserted, lacking domicile of either or place
of ceremony, upon mere personal service, although it might
be argued that now, because of the explicit setting up of
the three alternatives for annulment, the Legislature meant
to exclude the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise on any
fourth basis, as was speculated about before.
On the question of use of constructive notice by publica-
tion,97 long established for divorce and now clarified for
annulments, it might be remarked that General Equity
Rule 10A, promulgated in the interim, requiring an attempt
to give actual notice in addition to notice by publication,
and a showing of such attempt in the proceedings, was,
when first promulgated prior to the statutory clarification
of annulments, made applicable to both divorce and annul-
ment proceedings. Thus it inferentially assumed that orders
of publication could be used in annulment proceedings, and
this has been made certain by the subsequent legislation. 8
This Rule 10A may be the final outcome of the contro-
versy over requiring registered mail notice. This was once
put in the divorce statute9 in 1941 0 and then repealed in
1943,1°1 both prior to Rule 10A and the clarification of annul-
ment procedure. 102
912 Rev. 256-259, old notes 176-189.
" (Old note 183). Code, Art. 16, Sec. 31.
9 (Old note 184).
98 Code, Art. 16, Sec. 31.
Ibid.
'H Md. Laws, 1941, Ch. 516.10
"I Md. Laws, 1943, Ch. 18.
10 This sequence was really a case of history repeating itself, for that Md.
Laws, 1929, Ch. 559, had apparently provided for registered mail notice, but
it was understood to have been defectively enacted, and it was completely
repealed by Md. Laws, 1931, Ch. 451.
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The clarifying legislation also assimilated annulments
to divorces for the purpose of recognizihg residence on
federal reservations as tantamount to complete Maryland
residence. This had been thrown in doubt by an early
case 103 and had first led to legislation for divorce and then
to this legislation for annulment under the same provisions
as amended.10 4
PART Two
THE CONFUSING MARYLAND DoiMmnc
RELATIONS PROCEDURES1 "
The only general changes appertaining to the introduc-
tory part of the former (unsigned) comment on the con-
fusing Maryland domestic relations procedures concern
two things that were mentioned only in footnotes.'0 6
Furthermore, the last paragraph of the introductory
part could be amended to read that there are now three
(rather than four or five) procedures available for directly
attacking (and perhaps one for asserting) the validity of a
questionable marriage; that these procedures are assigned
to two (rather than three) basic types of courts (equity
and criminal); and that there are four (rather than three)
types of criminal procedures for non-support situations.
Declaring the Validity or Invalidity
of Marriage'°7
This portion of the supplemental treatment of the
former comment on procedures has already adequately
been covered, both by the earlier comment published in the
RrEvxiw'0 concerning the clarification of annulment, and by
the portion of this comment'0 9 next preceding the introduc-
tion which this part follows. It is not proposed to reiterate
in detail, any more than to give a skeleton outline of the
reforms accomplished in the interim.
2 'Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729,46 A. L. R. 9M3 (1926).
0 Code, Art. 16, Sec. 32.10 Concerning the old introduction, 4 Md. L. Rev. 275-277, old notes 1-7.
'0 (Old note 1). Maryland has now adopted a statute abolishing breach of
promise and alienation of affections actions, Code, Art. 75C. (Old note 7).
See, infra, circa, notes 137-142.
' 44 Rev. 277-280, old notes 8-31. New Code sections are: (Old note 9),
Art. 62, Sec. 16. (Old note 12). This is now provided for, see supra, note 84.
(Old note 13), Code, Art. 16, Sec. 33. (Old note 20), Code, Art. 31A. (Old
note 24), Art. 35, Sec. 4. (Old note 25), Art. 16, Sec. 39. (Old note 26), Art.
16, Sec. 31, now also including annulment.
108 9 Rev. 63, supra, note 75.
Supra, notes 74-104.
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The procedures should now be broken down into the
statutory-equity type, the divorce type, and the criminal
type, in lieu of the former breakdown of the statutory
(including criminal), divorce, and general equity types.
It is now clear that declaratory procedure, although en-
acted in the meanwhile, may not be used as another way
of annulment, but it is still to be hoped that it may be used
as a way of obtaining rulings in favor of the validity of
marriage.
Use of orders of publication has been clarified, not only
by Rule 10A but by the assimilation of statutory-equity
annulment to the divorce procedure, which also clarifies
the question of territorial jurisdiction, in that it permits
the cases to be brought either at the residence of the plain-
tiff, the residence of the defendant, or where the ceremony
was performed; and it is even more doubtful now that any
other basis of jurisdiction, such as merely personal service,
will suffice.
Residence on federal reservations has been clarified;
and likewise the legitimacy of the children of annulled mar-
riages has been declared by recent legislation.
Legally Terminating Marital Relations10
In the interim there has been considerable change in the
a vinculo divorce statute.' The pre-marital unchastity
ground was repealed in 1939. The period of desertion or
abandonment was reduced from three years to eighteen
months in 1941. The period of voluntary separation was
reduced from five years to three years in 1947. There was
added in 1949 the new ground of eighteen months imprison-
ment under a three year felony sentence. In a separate
Code section"" there was provided in 1941 the ground of
insanity, permanent and incurable, with at least three years
confinement in a mental institution.
This last named ground has itself considerable special
procedural detail in many respects different from the
general procedural detail that obtains for other divorce
grounds. For instance, the residence period is two years
on the part of at least one of the parties, regardless. There
I' 4 Rev. 281-285, old notes 32-52. New Code sections are: (Old 37), Art.
16, Sec. 33. (Old 38), Art. 16, Sec. 37. (Old 40), Art. 16, Sec. 34. (Old 41),
Art. 16, Sec. 14. (Old 43), Art. 16, Sec. 14. (Old 47), Art. 16, Sec. 40. (Old
51), Art. 16, Sec. 37.
I Code, Art. 16, Sec. 33.
I Code, Art. 16, Sec. 35.
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are special provisions for serving notice on the insane per-
son and/or his representative, and for a guardian ad litem,
and for the necessary evidence, and for the support of the
insane wife, and for the custody of the children, and other
detail especially adjusted to this unusual type of ground.
There have been no changes in the grounds for a mensa
divorce, although certain other provisions of the section'1 3
which do not concern a mensa divorce entirely have been
changed, particularly the provision permitting custody
pendente lite to be awarded.1 4 This provision governs all
types of divorce and is merely put in the a mensa section
by some historical accident.
As mentioned above for annulment,"1 5 the new General
Equity Rule 10A which requires an attempt to give actual
notice to the defendant in addition to using an order of
publication, followed by a showing to the court of such
attempt, equally applies to divorce; and this rule takes the
place of the abortive attempt to require notice by registered
mail, which had been put in the divorce statute in 1941 and
then repealed in 1943."1
The residence requirement, where the grounds, other
than insanity, occur outside the State was reduced from
two years to one year in 1941."'
In 1947 there was passed a provision'" permitting the
divorce courts to make distribution of the personal prop-
erty of the spouses (other than chattels real) which pro-
vision was necessary because the case of Hall v. Hall,"9
decided that there was then no jurisdiction in the divorce
courts to make such distribution, and thus the statute was
passed to provide authority therefor. The statute was
applied in the later case of Hahn v. Hahn. 20
The case of Croyle v. Croyle,121 noted in the REviw,12 2
threw some light on the difficult question of setting aside a
divorce decree for fraud in its obtention, and the REVIEw's
discussion of it was particularly concerned with the juris-
dictional problem.
"1 Code, Art. 16, Sec. 34.
"'Added, Md. Laws, 1949, Ch. 370.
"5 Supra, note 97.
"' Supra, notes 99-102.
Code, Art. 16, See. 39.
115 Code, Art. 16, See. 38.
"5180 Md. 353, 24 A. 2d 415 (1942).
"192 Md. 561, 64 A. 2d 739 (1949).
184 Md. 126, 40 A. 2d 374 (1944).
"5Note, Alternative Reasons for Setting Aside a Divorce Obtained by
Fraud, 8 Md. L. Rev. 253 (1944).
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The cases of Brooks v. Brooks'23 and Ritz v. Ritz,124
also noted in the R ,vIEw,125 ere concerned with amending
divorce cases; and the case of Lickle v. Boone,' 26 established
the rule that a co-respondent in a divorce case has no stand-
ing to intervene and participate in the litigation.
Adjudicating the Custody of Children12T
In the interim since the previous comment, considerable
legislation has been passed that falls into this area. Two
of the sections of the habeas corpus article 12 have been
repealed, apparently the two giving jurisdiction in habeas
corpus to determine the custody of children as such. Seem-
ingly the problem is now referred to the general equity
procedure for adjudicating custody129 and/or to the Juve-
nile Courts or other provisions for delinquent children.
The general equity procedure' and likewise that for
adjudicating custody in divorce cases,' 3 ' whether a divorce
is granted or denied, have both been amended so as to per-
mit the award of custody pendente lite as well as at the con-
clusion of the proceedings. This was apparently motivated
by a case 11 2 which had interpreted the divorce power as
being limited to awarding custody at the termination of
the case, even though, since 1920, it has been possible to
award custody then whether the divorce be decreed or
denied. Before 1920, it could only be awarded if the divorce
were decreed.'
The apparent abolition of the use of habeas corpus as
a way of adjudicating the custody of children, implicit in
the repeal of the two sections mentioned above, is further
184 Md. 419, 41 A. 2d 367 (1945).
' 188 Md. 336, 52A. 2d 729 (1947).
Note, The Amending of Alimony and Divorce Ca8e8 in Maryland, 9 Md.
L. Rev. 184 (1948).
'187 Md. 479, 51 A. 2d 162 (1947).
IN4 Rev. 285-288, old notes 53-65. New Code sections are: (Old 52A), Art.
4, Sec. 3; Art. 27, Sec. 787. (Old 53), Art. 42, Sec. 22 (formerly 19; former
20-21 have been repealed). (Old 54), Art. 16, Sec. 75. (Old 55), Repealed.
(Old 56), Art. 42, Sec. 19; Art. 5, Sec. 31. (Old 57), Art. 16, Sec. 75; former
Art. 42, Sec. 21, repealed. (Old 58), Art. 16, Sec. 34. (Old 59), Art. 93, Secs.
158-218. (Old 64), Art. 16, Sec. 37. (Old 65), Art. 72A, Sec. 4; Art. 93,
Sec. 162.
" (Old 55), Md. Code (1924), Art. 42, Secs. 20, 21, repealed by Maryland
Laws, 1945, Ch. 797.
Code, Art. 16, Sec. 75.
Ibid.
Code, Art. 16, Sec. 34.1 Hood v. Hood, 138 Md. 355, 113 A. 895, 15 A. L. R. 774 (1921).
Murray v. Murray, 134 Md. 653, 107 A. 550 (1919), the rule of which was
changed by Md. Laws, 1920, Ch. 574, amending what is now Code, Art. 16,
Sec. 34.
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complicated by the fact that certain counties of the state"'
were specifically exempted from the law.
This exemption has still further been complicated by
the Court of Appeals case of Anderson v. Barkman,13 5 which
so interpreted the exemption of one of those counties as
precluding the use of the habeas corpus writ for adjudicat-
ing custody, because of the exemption; whereas a reading
of the statute convinces this writer that it was the purpose
of the exemption to preserve the previous practice in the
exempt counties. It remains to be seen what will be further
interpretation of this situation.
The recently enacted insanity divorce law'36 has special
provision for the court assuming normal custody jurisdic-
tion and also for modifying a custody provision.
In connection with the custody aspects of adoption 13 7 it
should be mentioned that in the interim the adoption laws
of the State have been completely revamped' and there-
fore the incidental custody aspect is subject to the changed
procedures now found in the new legislation. The adoption
law of the state prior to the revising was discussed by the
present writer in an article in the REviw139 and then, after
the revision, the changes were discussed in another article40
'"Allegany, Garrett, Prince Georges, Montgomery and Washington
Counties.
'72 A. 2d 709 (Md., 1950). The Court apparently regarded the exemp-
tion as only from the continued Art. 42, Sec. 22, formerly 19, and that the
repeal of old Secs. 20, 21, was State-wide. From the language this writer
concludes that the exemption from "the provisions of this Act" means the
entire Chapter, so that all three of the old sections would be still In force
In the exempt counties. The exemption clause appears in a basic section
(4A) of the entire Act, Md. Laws, 1945, Ch. 797, and not as a sub-division
of either of the other sections (4, 5) concerning habeas corpus. The Court
cited, on the repeal, Cockerham v. Children's Aid Society, 185 Md. 97, 43 A.
2d 197 (1945); and Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 55 A. 2d 487, 57 A. 2d
188 (1947).
1 Code. Art. 16, Sec. 35.
' (Old notes 60. 63).
Code, Art. 16, Secs. 76-94. Sec. 77 was later amended by Md. Laws, 1949,
Ch. 446, to add a fourth basis of territorial jurisdiction, i.e., for a county
where there is already pending a custody case involving the child. This
amendment was overlooked in including the revised adoption law in Article
16 of the 1951 Code. See, for a case involving this amended basis of juris-
diction, Anderson v. Barkman, supra, note 135, which dismissed an adoption
proceeding based only on this factor for the reason that the custody pro-
ceeding itself was without jurisdictional basis in the county. Consider also
that Md. Laws. 1947, Ch. 600. added Code, Art. 88A, Secs. 19-31. concerning
placement for foster care and adoption, and that this was amended by Md.
Laws, 1950, Ch. 6.3, changing various sections so as to forbid placements by
individuals except for certain close relatives, and repealing Sec. 16H as
enacted in 1947.
Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 275 (1943).
UO Strahorn, Changes Made by the New Adoption Law, 10 Md. L. Rev.
20 (1949).
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also by the present writer, and it is not proposed herein
to repeat the treatment made in the latter article, refer-
ence to which is here made for purposes of complete detail.
Suffice it to say, that the substantive and procedural
adoption provisions were completely revised, and certain
counties of the State were exempted from the procedural
provisions, as was the original intent. Because of obscurity
in the exemption provision, a curative act"" was shortly
passed to make it clear that the said counties were exempt
only from the procedural provisions. Therefore, the pro-
cedural provisions of the old law 42 still apply therein, but
the substantive provisions are state-wide.
The Juvenile Court procedures have been drastically
changed in the interim.14 3 A new general statute for the
counties outside of Baltimore City has been enacted,4
although there are always being passed and amended local
statutes applicable to certain counties, and no attempt is
made herein to tabulate those.
Likewise, for Baltimore City, by legislation 45 adding to
the local laws and charter of Baltimore City, the Juvenile
Court of Baltimore City has been elevated from a mere
Justice of the Peace court to a branch of one of the Circuit
(Equity) courts of Baltimore City and it now functions
at that level.
One interim case is of procedural interest, that of Stirn
v, Stirn,48 which permits the joinder in a single proceed-
ing in equity of a suit for alimony on behalf of the wife and
one concerning the custody of the children of the marriage.
Compelling the Support of Dependents 47
There has been some change in the procedures for sup-
port of dependents, both in the equity and the criminal
types, although there has been no change in the com-
mon law type of suit for reimbursement for necessaries
advanced others. 48
10 Md. Laws, (Sp. Sess.), 1947, Ch. 19.
22 Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, Secs. 78, 82.
", (Old note 61).
Code, Art. 26, Secs. 50-70.
"
5 Md. Laws, 1943, Ch. 818, amending and adding to Baltimore Charter
and Public Local Laws (Flack, 1949), Sees. 239-257.
1" 183 Md. 59, 36 A. 2d 695 (1944).
M 4 Rev. 289-295, old notes 66-82. New Oode sections are: (Old 66A), Art.
72A, See. 1. (Old 68), Art. 16, See. 15. (Old 70), Art. 72A, Sec. 1. (Old 71),
Art. 16, Sec. 34. (Old 72), Art. 16, See. 75.
1Consider Gregg v. Gregg, 87 A. 2d 581 (Md., 1952), which held that a
wife may not sue her husband for reimbursement for expending her own
money on her own necessaries.
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With reference to the equity types, a recent constitu-
tional amendment 49 has abolished the distinction between
true alimony on the one hand and contractual alimony and
equitable orders for children on the other, with reference
to the contempt power. It is now possible to punish for
contempt of court for violation of any equity order of any
of the sorts mentioned above, inasmuch as the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt was amended to
exclude from that idea alimony or equitable orders for the
support of wives or children or equitable ratification of con-
sent arrangements therefor in equity decrees.
There are special provisions in the new insanity divorce
statute150 concerning alimony and support, and these are
radically different from the ordinary understanding of ali-
mony in divorce cases. For instance, the plaintiff husband
may be required to put up a lump sum or give bond to
provide for the future support of his wife from the time
of divorce until the probable time of her death; and as well
may be required to pay periodically, even though he obtains
the divorce. The statute is a bit obscure as to whether a
plaintiff wife may be awarded alimony from the insane
estate of her defendant husband when she divorces him,
but it is arguable that that is the intent of the statute,
although it has not yet been so decided.
With reference to the difficult problem of enforcing sup-
port where the husband or father is in one state and the
wife or child is in another, the Legislature has passed
several statutes attempting to provide a working procedure.
First, in 1950,1 they enacted one version of a Uniform
Interstate Support Act, which did not prove satisfactory
and so in 1951,152 there was substituted for it another ver-
sion of a uniform type act, which was slightly amended at
the 1952 Session,'53 and, as so amended purports to provide a
procedure for reciprocity between the courts of this state
and the courts of another state when the person under duty
to support is located in one and the person entitled to
receive the support is located in the other.
On the criminal side there were three different statutes
of this sort and there are now four. There were the three
respectively for non-support of wife and child, non-support
of destitute parents, and the bastardy laws, and now there
10 (Old note 74). Md. Const. (1867), Art. 3, Sec. 38, as amended by Md.
Laws, 1950, Ch. 14, ratified at the election.
1w Code, Art. 16, Sec. 35.
u Md. Laws, 1950, Ch. 13.
1 Code, Art. 89C, enacted by Md. Laws, 1951, Ch. 301.
Md. Laws, 1952, Ch. 44, amending Code, Art. 890, Secs. 7, 11.
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has been added non-support of destitute adult child, the last
resulting from the case of Borchert v. Borchert,' which
had previously decided that there was no jurisdiction as the
law then stood to compel one to support his destitute adult
child. Legislation'55 soon followed, of the same sort that
has been on the books for the other three purposes. The
general approach is to make it a crime not to support, and
provide for conviction for not having supported, with sus-
pended sentence upon making contributions in the future,
together with provisions for consent procedures in the
offices of the State's Attorney.
The oldest one of these, for non-support of wife and
child,15 6 has been drastically changed in the interim not
only with numerous local provisions for concurrent juris-
diction in various named counties between different courts
therein; but also to clarify for concurrent jurisdiction as
between the county where the recipient lives and the
county where the one under the duty lives, so that the
prosecution may be brought in either county. A minor
change also applies to payments by institutions having
custody of the convicted persons. The most drastic change
was that which completely clarified the applicable non-
support of child law to make it clear that the wife as well
as the husband is under a duty, enforceable by the criminal
procedure, to support the children of the marriage.
There has been a slight change in the statute for non-
support for destitute parents5 7 in that the former require-
ment that the person under duty be "adult" and "resident"
of the state has been deleted, so that now any person hav-
ing a destitute parent in this state is under the duty as pro-
vided by the statute.
The bastardy statute 58 has been twice amended, once in
1941 to provide for blood tests in bastardy prosecutions,' 5
and again in 1947 to provide that the swearing out of a
warrant or the filing of a case with the State's Attorney
shall stay limitations in those cases. 6 '
There has been some case law, most of it noted in the
pages of the REviEw heretofore, on certain points of the
support procedure. The case of Winkel v. Winkel,'6' de-
1- 185 Md. 586, 45 A. 2d 463 (1945).
"4 Code, Art. 27, Sees. 105-111.
"4 (Old note 77). Code, Art. 27, Sees. 96-104.
151 (Old note 79). Code, Art. 27, Sees. 112-118.
(Old note 80). Code, Art. 12.
Code, Art. 12, See. 17, as added, Md. Laws, 1941, Ch. 307.
"4 Code, Art. 12, See. 15, as amended Md. Laws, 1947, Ch. 64.
"4 178 Md. 489, 15 A. 2d 914 (1940).
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cided that the Maryland courts have power to modify ali-
mony decrees even as to overdue installments. As pointed
out in the RxvIEw's casenote'82 on this, it cast considerable
doubt on the mandatory enforceability of Maryland ali-
mony decrees in other states, if the defendant removes
himself and/or his property, and it is necessary to enforce
the decree at the level of suing on a foreign judgment.
Two cases have involved the enforceability of alimony
against a spendthrift trust, one is Robertson v. Robertson,1 3
and the other is Hitchens v. Hitchens.'64
The former case apparently allowed the income from
the spendthrift trust to be reached to satisfy a true alimony
decree, but the latter case apparently qualified it by not
permitting support agreements, possibly even though in-
corporated into divorce decrees, similarly to have access to
spendthrift trusts.
Two other cases also contributed to the matter of the
procedure for collecting alimony, one is the case of Keen v.
Keen, 6' and the other is the case of Langville v. Langville.' 6
The former case was concerned with making the award
against the property of a non-resident, immune from per-
sonal service but who had property in the state; and in the
latter case it was held that the non-resident attachment
procedure could be used for the enforcement of overdue
equity support payments already properly awarded in a
case where there was jurisdiction over the husband-father.
Conclusion 67
This concludes the bringing down to date of the previous
article and comment, and, appropos the sentiments men-
tioned in the concluding portion of the former comment
about necessary reforms, be it mentioned that there has
1 Note, Power to Modify Overdue Installments of Alimony, 6 Md. L. Rev.
238 (1942).
193 Md. 1, 65 A. 2d 297 (1949), noted in Further on Whether a Spend-
thrift Trust May be Reached for Alimony or Support, 10 Md. L. Rev. 359
(1949). See also Note, May a Spendthrift Trust be Reached for Alimony or
Support, 4 Md. L. Rev. 417 (1940), noting Bauernschmidt v. S. D. & Tr. Co.,
176 Md. 351, 4 A. 2d 712 (1939).
193 Md. 53, 193 Md. 62, 66 A. 2d 93, 66 A. 2d 97 (1949), noted in Still
Further on Whether a Spendthrift Trust may be Reached for Alimony or
Support, 11 Md. L. Rev. 70 (1950).
191 Md. 31, 60 A. 2d 200 (1948), noted In Award of Alimony Against
Non-Resident Defendant Having Property Within State, 10 Md. L. Rev. 277
(1949). See also, Note, Enforceability of Foreign Decrees for Alimony or
Support, 4 Md. L. Rev. 423 (1940), noting Bauernscbmidt v. S. D. & Tr. Co.,
supra, note 163.
1191 Md. 103, 60 A. 2d 206 (1948), noted in Non-resident Attachment for
Overdue Support Payments, 11 Md. L. Rev. 251 (1950).
11"4 Rev. 295-296.
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been no drastic overall reform of the whole procedural
picture, but that there has been considerable improvement
in detail, particularly in the annulment field, where the
most thoroughgoing revision of an entire area was accom-
plished. The prospect of a unified domestic relations court
in Baltimore City seems still in the future, but there has
been a revival of the movement to consolidate the trial
courts of Baltimore City, and out of such reform, if achieved,
could come the setting up of a unified division of the unified
court for handling domestic relations problems in one place.
CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT- CONFLICT
OF LAWS - EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT
Third National Bank in Nashville v. Handy Janey'
In a recent lower court case the following set of facts
confronted the court. One England had purchased an auto-
mobile under a conditional sales contract from an automo-
bile dealer in Nashville, Tennessee. The conditional sales
contract was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff bank.
Without the plaintiff's permission, England drove the car
to Baltimore where he applied to the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles for a title certificate and as evidence of his
right he presented a bill of sale. The certificate was issued
showing no liens or encumbrances. England thereupon sold
the car to Bankart, a bona fide purchaser for value and with-
out notice of the prior conditional sales contract. Bankart
in turn sold the car to Back, who in turn sold the car to
Martin Brothers, Inc., who sold it to the defendant. The
conditional sales contract being in default the plaintiff
brought an action of replevin against the defendant. Ten-
nessee, where the conditional sale was executed, has no
recording provisions for conditional sales.' The Court was
called upon to decide whose rights were superior, those of
the conditional vendor or a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice who had purchased the car in a direct chain
from the original vendee. The court held that the valid title
of the conditional vendor in Tennessee should be recognized
in Maryland as superior to the rights of a subsequent inno-
cent purchaser. Under our Maryland statutes' the condi-
1 Superior Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, Jan. 17, 1951.
2 Michie's Tennessee Code of 1938, Sec. 7286, merely requires evidence of a
writing in order to retain title in the conditional vendor.
3Md. Code (1951), Art. 21, Sec. 71.
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